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Abstract
We study resource allocation under private information when the planner cannot
prevent bilateral side trading between consumers and firms. Adverse selection and side
trading severely restrict feasible trades: each marginal quantity must be fairly priced
given the consumer types who purchase it. The resulting social costs are twofold.
First, second-best efficiency and robustness to side trading are in general irreconcilable
requirements. Second, there actually exists only one budget-feasible allocation robust
to side trading, which deprives the planner from any capacity to redistribute resources
between different types of consumers. We discuss the relevance of our results for
insurance and financial markets.
Keywords: Adverse Selection, Side Trading, Second-Best Allocations.
JEL Classification: D43, D82, D86.
∗This paper supersedes the first part of “Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets” (TSE Working
Paper n◦ 14-532) by the same authors. We thank the Editor, Gilat Levy, and three anonymous referees
for very thoughtful and detailed comments. Financial support from the ANR (Programme d’Investissement
d’Avenir ANR-17-EURE-0010) and the Chaire SCOR–TSE is gratefully acknowledged.
†Toulouse School of Economics, CNRS, University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France, and Universita`
degli Studi di Roma“Tor Vergata,” Roma, Italy. Email: andrea.attar@tse-fr.eu.
‡Toulouse School of Economics, CNRS, University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France. Email:
thomas.mariotti@tse-fr.eu.
§Toulouse School of Economics, INRA, University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France. Email:
francois.salanie@tse-fr.eu.
1 Introduction
The theory of incentives identifies the holding of private information by economic agents
as a fundamental constraint on the allocation of resources (Hurwicz (1973)). Standard
aggregate resource constraints must accordingly be supplemented by incentive-compatibility
constraints that reflect the agents’ ability to conceal their private information (Myerson
(1979, 1982)). The problem of the optimal allocation of resources then reduces to that of
characterizing informationally constrained efficient, or second-best, allocations (Harris and
Townsend (1981)). The key finding is that a tradeoff arises between redistribution and
incentives (Mirrlees (1971)).
A crucial assumption of theories of the second-best is that, although individual types
are unobservable, individual trades can be perfectly monitored by the planning authority.
Because few, if any, economic institutions have the required ability to monitor all individual
trades, this calls for an explicit consideration of the role of side trading in the theory of
resource allocation under private information, as first pointed out by Hammond (1979).
To this end, we consider a general environment in which firms can provide a divisible
good to privately informed consumers who may be of two types. Consumers’ preferences
satisfy a single-crossing condition, and there is adverse selection in that consumers who
are more willing to trade are also more costly to serve; private values arise as a limiting
case when consumers’ types are not payoff-relevant for the firms selling to them. This
framework encompasses many applications, including the standard Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976) insurance economy as a prominent example.
In this setting, we characterize the allocations that can be achieved by a planner who
observes neither consumers’ types nor the trades they may conduct with firms. To do so,
we refine the standard notion of incentive-feasibility by focusing on allocations that are
robust to side trading. This reflects two additional constraints on resource allocation. First,
the planner cannot force consumers to trade with him; this is the case, for instance, when
consumers can opt out of a publicly provided health-insurance plan, as in the current German
system. Second, he cannot prevent them from engaging in mutually advantageous additional
trades with a firm. We formalize these constraints by requiring the planner to offer a tariff
such that no firm, acting as an entrant, can guarantee itself a positive profit by offering
complementary side trades. This approach provides us with a modified criterion of incentive
feasibility which is useful for evaluating the social costs of side trading. Focusing on two-
type environments affords us a straightforward comparison with standard characterizations
of the second-best efficiency frontier in both private-value (Bierbrauer and Boyer (2014))
and common-value (Prescott and Townsend (1984), Crocker and Snow (1985), Bisin and
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Gottardi (2006)) environments.
We show that the social costs of side trading are twofold. First, second-best allocations
are typically not robust to side trading, so that the planner’s inability to monitor consumers’
trades has significant welfare implications. Second, only one budget-feasible allocation is
robust to side trading, so that the third-best efficiency frontier reduces to a point: the threat
of side trading effectively deprives the planner from any capacity to redistribute resources
between different types of consumers. The allocation we characterize is thus the natural
candidate for a competitive equilibrium, but, being the only feasible one under side trading,
little, if anything, can be argued about its desirability.
A distinctive feature of our approach is that we model side trade as bilateral contracts
between a consumer and a firm. This reflects our dissatisfaction with the standard way of
representing unobservable side trades as transactions on Walrasian markets, which would call
for a centralized market institution to ensure that all these trades take place at the same price.
Bilateral trading plays a key role in our analysis. Our key Lemma 1, in particular, shows that
budget-feasible allocations robust to side trading have a very peculiar price structure: each
marginal quantity, or layer, is priced at the cost of serving the types who purchase it. This
form of competitive pricing, reminiscent of Akerlof (1970), implies that there are no cross-
subsidies between these layers, though there may be cross-subsidies between types. When
the allocation is interior and separating, linear pricing can emerge only in the private-value
limiting case.
Lemma 1 has a simple but important implication that we state in Theorem 1: no second-
best allocation in which only one incentive compatibility-constraint binds is robust to side
trading. The reason is that, by the standard efficiency-at-the-top property, consumers for
which this constraint binds must trade at the margin at the cost of serving them. As a result,
the layer that connects the trades of the two types cannot be priced at the cost of serving the
type who is the most willing to trade. But then, by Lemma 1, there always exists some side
trade that a firm finds it profitable to conduct with at least one consumer type. For instance,
in the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) insurance economy, any second-best allocation in which
the high-risk type’s incentive-compatibility constraint binds can be exploited by an entrant
offering complementary coverage at a premium rate slightly higher than the high-risk fair
premium rate, which this type is willing to trade along with the coverage provided by the
allocation for the low-risk type.
Our second main result, Theorem 2, states that, among the allocations that feature no
cross-subsidies between layers, only one is robust to side trading, namely, the Pareto-efficient
one that maximizes the utility of the consumer type who is the less willing to trade. This
uniqueness result stands in stark contrast with the nondegenerate second-best efficiency
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frontier that emerges from the standard tradeoff between redistribution and incentives. To
complete our characterization, we evaluate whether this allocation can be second-best, hence
considering the situations not covered by Theorem 1. Theorem 3 shows that a second-best
allocation robust to side trading must either feature pooling of the two consumers’ types,
or each type purchasing her first-best quantity. We argue that these situations can only
occur under very special assumptions on preferences and costs. Thus the unique third-best
allocation typically does not belong to the second-best efficiency frontier.
Related Literature
While the constraints induced by private information on resource allocation are by now well
understood, less is known about the impact of side trading on feasibility and redistribution.
Starting with the early contributions of Hammond (1979, 1987), Allen (1985), and Jacklin
(1987), several authors have attempted to identify the limits to risk sharing generated by
consumers’ side trading in financial markets. Cole and Kocherlakota (2001), Golosov and
Tsyvinski (2007), Farhi, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2009) have analyzed different private-value
environments in which the planner is constrained by the existence of Walrasian markets
on which privately informed consumers can complement their trades with the planner by
trading linearly priced commodities. This raises two sets of questions, which we address in
this paper. First, the existence of unobservable transactions is at odds with the idea that
all trades take place in a centralized Walrasian market where a single market-clearing price
is quoted—the issue is not so much that the quantities traded are unobservable, which is
consistent with the functioning of a Walrasian market, but rather that side trades may take
place at different prices and that bilateral contracting prevents the planner from monitoring
the terms of these trades. Second, if one sticks to the Walrasian paradigm, extending the
approach to incorporate common values and adverse selection presents severe conceptual
difficulties (Prescott and Townsend (1984), Rustichini and Siconolfi (2008)); a possible way
out is to rely on an Akerlof-like (1970) equilibrium, which however only obtains under linear
utilities and/or indivisibilities (Attar, Mariotti, and Salanie´ (2011), Philippon and Skreta
(2012), Tirole (2012)). We hence depart from the above literature in two ways. First, we
offer an alternative representation of side trading, which we essentially regard as a bilateral
rather than a centralized process. Second, we focus on trade under common values; hence,
in a bilateral relationship, a firm’s profit directly depends on the types of the consumers it
trades with, which is arguably a prominent feature of insurance and financial markets.
The constraints induced by private contracting on redistribution between workers who
are privately informed of their productivities have also been investigated by Stantcheva
(2014) in the context of optimal taxation. In her framework, however, the State retains
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full observability of workers’ total incomes, as in Mirrlees (1971), which severely limits their
ability to engage in side trading.
Our requirement that an allocation must be implementable by an entry-proof tariff to
be robust to side trading is in line with the definition by Kahn and Mookherjee (1998) or
Bisin and Guaitoli (2004) of third-best allocations in moral-hazard environments. In any
such allocation, the planner’s tariff must prevent consumers from complementing it with
an additional profit-making contract provided by a firm. We extend this notion to private-
information environments, and, in addition, we put no restriction on the side trades a firm
can make available.
The unique third-best allocation that we characterize has been formerly derived by
Glosten (1994) and Attar, Mariotti, and Salanie´ (2019a) as the outcome of competitive
financial markets where market makers are restricted to post collections of limit orders and
insiders thus face a convex aggregate tariff. In contrast with these authors, we adopt a
fully normative perspective. This requires imposing no restriction on sides trades, which we
assume to be fully bilateral. In line with this assumption, we allow firms to react to the
planner’s tariff by posting arbitrary tariffs. Jaynes (1978), Hellwig (1988), and Stiglitz, Yun,
and Kosenko (2018) show that this allocation can also be obtained in an equilibrium of a
modified Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) insurance economy in which insurance companies
can exchange information about their customers. Although the allocation is the same, the
logic of our approach is entirely different. First, these authors allow firms to react to the
information disclosed by their competitors by possibly enforcing exclusivity clauses, which
is at odds with the very notion of side trading that we emphasize. Second, as noticed above,
we are interested in the normative implications of side trading and not in characterizing the
equilibrium of a given extensive-form game. We return to the issue of the decentralization
of the third-best allocation in Section 4.
Our analysis shares with the common-agency literature (Martimort (2007)) the idea
that what can be implemented by a principal—here, the planner—crucially depends on
the trades made available by other principals—here, an entrant. Our normative approach,
however, differs from the fully strategic approach adopted, in a similar environment, by Attar,
Mariotti, and Salanie´ (2014). The idea is that when a planner contemplates implementing
an allocation by a tariff, he always anticipates that an entrant, acting as a follower, may
complement this tariff by providing consumers with further trading opportunities. The
requirement that the planner’s tariff be entry-proof then captures in a natural way the
additional constraints that the possibility of side trades imposes on the planner.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 defines our
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concept of robustness to side trading, fully characterizes the only feasible allocation satisfying
this requirement, and shows that it is typically not second-best. Section 4 discusses the
relevance of our results for insurance and financial markets. Proofs not given in the text can
be found in the Appendix.
2 The Economy
Consumers There is a continuum of consumers who can purchase a divisible good in
exchange for monetary transfers. Each consumer is privately informed of her type i = 1, 2
and the proportion of type i among consumers is mi > 0. Type i’s preferences over quantity-
transfer bundles (q, t) ∈ R+×R are represented by a strictly quasiconcave and continuously
differentiable utility function ui, with ∂tui < 0. Hence her marginal rate of substitution
τi ≡ − ∂qui
∂tui
is well defined and strictly decreasing along her indifference curves. We impose the Inada
condition that τi(q, t) vanishes as q grows large along any such curve. Hence, whatever
her endowment point, type i’s demand at any price p > 0 is finite. The following strict
single-crossing condition is the key determinant of consumer demand:
For all q and t, τ2(q, t) > τ1(q, t). (1)
Thus type 2 is more willing to increase her purchases than type 1.
Firms The supply side of the economy is described by a constant-return-to-scale technology,
with unit cost ci > 0 of serving type i. Type 2 is weakly more costly to serve than type 1:
c2 ≥ c1. (2)
Together with (1), (2) typically generates adverse selection, whereas values are private in
the limiting case c1 = c2. We let c ≡ m1c1 +m2c2 be the average cost of serving a consumer.
These assumptions hold in the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) insurance economy: ci
is type i’s riskiness, with c2 > c1, q is the amount of coverage she purchases, and t is
the premium she pays in return. Our model encompasses many other specifications and is
relevant for a broad spectrum of insurance, financial, and labor markets.
Incentive Feasibility and Efficiency A contract is a pair (q, t) for some q ≥ 0, and with
unit price t/q if q > 0. An allocation is a pair of contracts, one for each type. An allocation
(qi, ti)i=1,2 is budget-feasible if
m1(t1 − c1q1) +m2(t2 − c2q2) ≥ 0.
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To this aggregate resource constraint, we must add, following Myerson (1979, 1982) and
Harris and Townsend (1981), constraints reflecting that the allocation of resources takes
place under asymmetric information. An allocation (qi, ti)i=1,2 is incentive-compatible if
u1(q1, t1) ≥ u1(q2, t2) and u2(q2, t2) ≥ u2(q1, t1).
We denote these constraints by IC1→2 and IC2→1, respectively. An allocation is incentive-
feasible if it is budget-feasible and incentive-compatible. A second-best allocation is Pareto-
efficient among incentive-feasible allocations. This is the relevant notion of efficiency for a
planner who perfectly monitors trades, but does not observe consumer types (Prescott and
Townsend (1984)). In the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) insurance economy, the second-best
efficiency frontier consists of a continuum of allocations (Crocker and Snow (1985), Bisin and
Gottardi (2006)).
Tariffs A tariff T is a schedule specifying a transfer T (q) to be paid in return for a quantity
q, with T (0) = 0 in case a consumer chooses not to trade along the tariff and T (q) = ∞ in
case the tariff does not allow consumers to purchase the quantity q. A tariff T implements
the allocation (qi, ti)i=1,2 if
For each i, qi ∈ arg max{ui(q, T (q)) : q ≥ 0} and ti = T (qi).
To ensure that the various maximization problems we will encounter have solutions, we
impose the mild requirement that a tariff be lower semicontinuous, with T (q)/q bounded
away from 0 as q grows large; this notably holds true if T has a compact domain.
3 Second-Best Allocations and Side Trading
When side trading is feasible, the planner can no longer monitor trades between consumers
and firms. This imposes two additional constraints on resource allocation. First, the planner
cannot force consumers to trade with him, reflecting that they can opt out of any mechanism
he could propose. To model this constraint, we require that the planner offer a tariff T P ,
the key restriction being T P (0) = 0. Second, the planner cannot prevent consumers from
engaging in mutually advantageous additional trades with a firm. To model this constraint,
we require that T P be such that no firm, acting as an entrant, can guarantee itself a positive
profit by offering complementary side trades.
Side trades are usually assumed to take place on Walrasian markets (Hammond (1979,
1987), Allen (1985), Jacklin (1987), Cole and Kocherlakota (2001), Golosov and Tsyvinski
(2007), Farhi, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2009)); in our context, this would amount to impose
that the entrant must post a linear tariff. We find this at odds with the idea that side
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trades cannot be monitored and instead allow the entrant to post an arbitrary tariff TE;
the taxation principle (Hammond (1979), Guesnerie (1981), Rochet (1985)) ensures that
this involves no loss of generality. Notice that we do not thereby prevent the entrant from
offering a linear tariff; rather, the key idea is that the entrant can choose the terms of side
trades and restrict the set of quantities consumers can choose from. This motivates the
following definition.
Definition 1 The planner’s tariff T P is entry-proof if, for any entrant’s tariff TE, there
exists a solution (qPi , q
E
i ) to each type i’s problem
max{Ui(qP + qE, T P (qP ) + TE(qE)) : qP ≥ 0 and qE ≥ 0} (3)
such that entry is not profitable:
m1[T
E(qE1 )− c1qE1 ] +m2[TE(qE2 )− c2qE2 ] ≤ 0. (4)
An allocation is robust to side trading if it can be implemented by an entry-proof tariff.
It may at first be objected that we are tilting the odds in the planner’s favor by de facto
assuming that he is able, in case consumers are indifferent, to coordinate their behavior
on an allocation in which the entrant does poorly. However, this assumption plays no role
in the characterization results we offer in Theorems 1–3: indeed, Theorem 2 shows that
this arguably weak entry-proofness concept already singles out a unique budget-feasible
allocation robust to side trading; moreover, the necessary conditions we derive are obtained
using contracts that are profitable for the entrant no matter the consumers’ best responses.
By contrast, strengthening our entry-proofness concept—for instance, by requiring that the
planner’s tariff be robust to entry no matter the consumers’ best responses—would threaten
the very existence of a budget-balanced allocation robust to side trading. This situation,
however, is hardly specific to our model: indeed, when sustaining equilibria of competitive
adverse-selection models, it is often necessary to assume that firms cannot sort out the least
costly types at the deviation stage in case consumers are indifferent.1
Any allocation robust to side trading is incentive-compatible. The question we ask is
whether such an allocation can also be second-best. Our argument is twofold.
On the one hand, budget-feasible allocations robust to side trading have the following
price structure.
Lemma 1 In any budget-feasible allocation (qi, ti)i=1,2 robust to side trading,
t1 = cq1 and t2 − t1 = c2(q2 − q1). (5)
1This in particular the case when the equilibrium allocation involves some amount of pooling, as in Akerlof
(1970), Miyazaki (1977), Wilson (1977), Spence (1978), and Attar, Mariotti, and Salanie´ (2011).
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Proof. Because an allocation (qi, ti)i=1,2 robust to side trading is incentive-compatible, it
satisfies q2 ≥ q1 by single crossing. Moreover,
t1 ≤ cq1. (6)
Otherwise, an entrant can supply q1 at a price slightly above c: this profitably attracts type
1 as T P (0) = 0, and remains profitable even if type 2 is attracted. Similarly,
t2 − t1 ≤ c2(q2 − q1). (7)
Otherwise, an entrant can supply q2− q1 at a price slightly above c2: this profitably attracts
type 2 along with the contract (q1, t1), and is even more profitable if type 1 is also attracted.
Rewriting the resource constraint as
t1 − cq1 +m2[t2 − t1 − c2(q2 − q1)] ≥ 0
and taking advantage of (6)–(7) yields (5). The result follows. 
Hence pricing is competitive, in the sense that the prices of the layers q1 and q2 − q1
reflect the costs of serving the types who purchases them. However, if c2 > c1 and q1 > 0,
then the quantities q1 and q2 are not priced competitively: as q1 is sold at the average cost
c > c1, type 1 subsidizes type 2.
On the other hand, second-best allocations satisfy the following efficiency-at-the-top
property.
Lemma 2 In any second-best allocation (qi, ti)i=1,2,
(i) If IC2→1 is slack, then τ1(q1, t1) ≤ c1, with equality if q1 > 0.
(ii) If IC1→2 is slack, then τ2(q2, t2) = c2.
Proof. If IC2→1 or IC1→2 is slack, then q2 > q1 by incentive compatibility and single
crossing. If IC2→1 is slack and τ1(q1, t1) > c1, then ((q1 + ε, t1 + c1ε), (q2, t2)) is incentive-
feasible for ε > 0 small enough and Pareto-dominates (qi, ti)i=1,2, a contradiction. Thus
τ1(q1, t1) ≤ c1. Moreover, if q1 > 0 and τ1(q1, t1) < c1, then ((q1 − ε, t1 − c1ε), (q2, t2)) is
incentive-feasible for ε > 0 small enough and Pareto-dominates (qi, ti)i=1,2, once again a
contradiction. This proves (i). The proof of (ii) is similar, using q2 > 0, and is therefore
omitted. The result follows. 
Combining Lemmas 1 and 2 yields our first main theorem.
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Theorem 1 A second-best allocation in which only one incentive-compatibility constraint
binds is not robust to side trading.
Proof. Suppose first that only IC1→2 binds. Then q2 > q1 by incentive compatibility and
single crossing, and τ1(q1, t1) ≤ c1 by Lemma 2(i). Moreover, because type 1’s preferences
are strictly convex and IC1→2 binds, we have t2 − t1 < c1(q2 − q1) ≤ c2(q2 − q1). By Lemma
1, (qi, ti)i=1,2 is not robust to side trading.
Suppose next that only IC2→1 binds. Then q2 > q1 by incentive compatibility and single
crossing, and τ2(q2, t2) = c2 by Lemma 2(ii). Moreover, because type 2’s preferences are
strictly convex and IC2→1 binds, we have t2 − t1 > c2(q2 − q1). By Lemma 1, (qi, ti)i=1,2 is
not robust to side trading. Hence the result. 
Theorem 1 covers most cases emphasized in the literature. For instance, in the Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1976) insurance economy, either IC1→2 or IC2→1 bind in all but the pooling
second-best allocation (Crocker and Snow (1985)), and Theorem 1 implies that none of these
allocations is robust to side trading.
This leaves only two cases in which a second-best allocation may be robust to side trading:
when both IC1→2 and IC2→1 bind, which corresponds to a pooling allocation, or when both
IC1→2 and IC2→1 are slack. Both cases can arise, as we show below, but only under very
special assumptions on preferences and costs.
To study these cases, we strengthen Lemma 1 by establishing that a unique allocation
is budget-feasible and robust to side trading. In this allocation, the first layer is optimal
for type 1 at price c, while the second layer is optimal for type 2 at price c2, conditional on
her purchasing the first layer. This allocation is thus Pareto-efficient—maximizing type 1’s
utility—among those satisfying (5).
Theorem 2 The third-best allocation defined by
q∗1 ≡ arg max{u1(q, cq) : q ≥ 0}, (8)
t∗1 ≡ cq∗1, (9)
q∗2 ≡ q∗1 + arg max{u2(q∗1 + q, t∗1 + c2q) : q ≥ 0}, (10)
t∗2 ≡ t∗1 + c2(q∗2 − q∗1), (11)
is the only budget-feasible allocation robust to side trading.
Proof. (Uniqueness) Because an allocation (qi, ti)i=1,2 robust to side trading is incentive-
compatible, it satisfies q2 ≥ q1 by single crossing. Moreover,
u1(q1, t1) ≥ max{u1(q, cq) : q ≥ 0}. (12)
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Otherwise, an entrant can offer a contract with unit price slightly above c that profitably
attracts type 1 as T P (0) = 0, and remains profitable even if type 2 is attracted. Similarly,
u2(q2, t2) ≥ max{u2(q1 + q, t1 + c2q) : q ≥ 0}. (13)
Otherwise, an entrant can offer a contract with unit price slightly above c2 that profitably
attracts type 2 along with the contract (q1, t1), and is even more profitable if type 1 is also
attracted. Finally, if (qi, ti)i=1,2 is budget-feasible, then (5) holds, so that (12)–(13) are
equalities. Thus (qi, ti)i=1,2 is the third-best allocation defined by (8)–(11).
(Existence) By (8)–(11), the piecewise-linear convex tariff
T P (q) ≡ 1{q≤Q∗1}cq + 1{q>Q∗1}[cq∗1 + c2(q − q∗1)] (14)
implements the third-best allocation. Now, suppose that an entrant posts a tariff TE. The
following monotonicity property is established in the Appendix.
Lemma 3 There exists a solution ((qPi , q
E
i ))i=1,2 to (3) such that q
E
2 ≥ qE1 .
Let us fix such a solution in what follows. As T P allows type 1 to purchase her optimal
quantity q∗1 at price c, we must have
TE(qE1 ) ≤ cqE1 . (15)
Moreover, because qE2 ≥ qE1 , type 2 could alternatively obtain the same aggregate quantity
qP2 +q
E
2 as in her best response by purchasing q
E
1 from the entrant and q
P
2 +q
E
2 −qE1 from the
planner, paying overall T P (qP2 + q
E
2 − qE1 ) +TE(qE1 ). As she chooses to pay T P (qP2 ) +TE(qE2 )
instead, we must have
TE(qE2 )− TE(qE1 ) ≤ T P (qP2 + qE2 − qE1 )− T P (qP2 ). (16)
Because T P is convex with slope at most c2 and q
E
2 ≥ qE1 ,
T P (qP2 + q
E
2 − qE1 )− T P (qP2 ) ≤ c2(qE2 − qE1 ). (17)
Collecting (15) and (16)–(17) yields
TE(qE1 )− cqE1 +m2[TE(qE2 )− TE(qE1 )− c2(qE2 − qE1 )] ≤ 0,
which is (4). This shows that T P is entry-proof. Hence the result. 
The uniqueness of the third-best allocation contrasts with the multiplicity of second-best
allocations, which form a nondegenerate frontier. The planner is thus severely constrained by
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his inability to monitor trades, which effectively prevents any kind of redistribution between
different types of consumers.
The existence of such an allocation for any binary distribution of types is also noteworthy.
Nonexclusivity, or consumers’ ability to combine the contracts offered by an entrant with
those offered by the planner, is key to this result. While this enlarges the set of contracts an
entrant can use to attract consumers, this also gives the planner more instruments to deter
entry. These take the form of latent contracts, which are not meant to be traded but only
to make entry unprofitable. Of course, the planner must make sure that, by offering latent
contracts, he does not create new profitable entry opportunities. The third-best tariff (14)
strikes a balance between these two requirements.
In the adverse-selection case c2 > c1, type 1’s and type 2’s marginal rates of substitution
at the third-best allocation are strictly ordered, τ1(q
∗
1, t
∗
1) < τ2(q
∗
2, t
∗
2). In particular, we
have τ1(q
∗
1, t
∗
1) = c < c2 = τ2(q
∗
2, t
∗
2) if the third-best allocation is interior and separating.
This contrasts with private-value models where side trades take place on Walrasian markets,
which calls for an equalization of marginal rates of substitution (Hammond (1979, 1987)).
Yet incentive-compatible gains from trade between types 1 and 2 are exhausted at the third-
best allocation, subject to the side-trading constraint. Indeed, supposing that consumers
have access to the same constant-return-to-scale technology as firms, the minimum price at
which type 1 would be willing to sell a small additional quantity to type 2 is c2, and at
this price type 2 is not willing to buy. In that sense, the third-best allocation is the only
candidate for a competitive equilibrium.
Regarding the proof of Theorem 2, an interesting duality is that the third-best allocation
is the only candidate for a budget-feasible allocation robust to side trading even if the entrant
can only offer a single contract, while the third-best tariff is entry-proof even if the entrant
can post an arbitrary tariff. This differs from Glosten (1994), who in his analysis of limit-
order markets requires the entrant’s tariff to satisfy a property he dubs single crossing and
that generalizes convexity. Another important difference is that Theorem 2 does not require
consumers’ preferences to be quasilinear, which makes it relevant for standard insurance
economies.
We are now ready to address the remaining cases not covered by Theorem 1.
Theorem 3 If a second-best allocation is robust to side trading, then it coincides with the
third-best allocation and one of the following conditions holds:
(i) The third-best allocation is pooling, that is, τ2(q
∗
1, t
∗
1) ≤ c2.
(ii) The third-best allocation is separating and first-best, that is, c1 = c2 or τ1(0, 0) ≤ c1.
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Proof. By Theorem 2, if a second-best allocation is robust to side trading, then it coincides
with the third-best allocation. By Theorem 1, we only need to consider two cases.
(i) If IC1→2 and IC2→1 bind, then q∗2 = q
∗
1 by incentive compatibility and single crossing.
Hence the third-best allocation is pooling, which amounts to τ2(q
∗
1, t
∗
1) ≤ c2 by (10)–(11).
(ii) If IC1→2 and IC2→1 are slack, then q∗2 > q
∗
1 by incentive compatibility and single
crossing. Hence the third-best allocation is separating. Two cases can arise. If q∗1 > 0, then
τ1(q
∗
1, t
∗
1) = c1 by Lemma 2(i) and τ1(q
∗
1, t
∗
1) = c by (8)–(9), so that c1 = c2. If q
∗
1 = 0, then
τ1(0, 0) ≤ c1 by Lemma 2(i). In either case, each type i trades efficiently at cost ci, so that
the third-best allocation is first-best. Hence the result. 
Condition (i) is clearly extreme. It cannot hold in a Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
insurance economy, because the optimal coverage of type 1 at the average premium rate c is
only partial, while type 2 is willing to purchase additional coverage at the fair premium rate c2
until she reaches full insurance. In the case of quasilinear preferences, condition (i) together
with the condition τ1(q
∗
1, t
∗
1) ≤ c implied by (8)–(9) entails that type 1’s first-best quantity
is at least as large as type 2’s, and strictly larger if q∗1 > 0, a case of nonresponsiveness
(Caillaud, Guesnerie, Rey, and Tirole (1988)).
Condition (ii) is also extreme. Indeed, the third-best allocation is then first-best, and the
third-best tariff is linear with slope c2. In the private-value case c1 = c2, each type trades
efficiently at marginal cost. In the adverse-selection case c2 > c1, a separating second-best
allocation is robust to side trading only if type 1 is not willing to trade at cost c1 and hence
is in some sense irrelevant.
This answers the question we raised in this section: second-best efficiency and robustness
to side trading are irreconcilable requirements, except in very special cases. Overall, our
results suggest that the threat of side trading constitutes a serious obstacle to efficiency and
redistribution in private-information economies. In the limiting case of private values, side
trading poses no threat to efficiency, as it leads to a first-best allocation; yet the requirement
that there be no cross-subsidies between layers precludes the planner from redistributing
resources between different consumer types. By contrast, under adverse selection, the social
costs of side trading are twofold: first, the threat of side trading moves the economy away
from the second-best efficiency frontier; second, it precludes redistribution.
4 Decentralization and Market Intervention
The Decentralization Problem Determining whether constrained-efficient allocations
can be supported in an equilibrium of an adverse-selection economy is a central issue for
welfare economics. Bisin and Gottardi (2006) provide a positive answer to this question in
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the case of fully observable trades: for any second-best allocation, there exists a system of
transfers ensuring that this allocation obtains in an equilibrium of a decentralized economy in
which firms compete by offering exclusive contracts. However, in the polar case where firms
can only observe their own trades with consumers, decentralizing a third-best allocation is
a more delicate task. To perform it, one needs to explicitly model firms’ behavior when no
information on consumers’ aggregate trades is available to them.
In perfectly competitive markets, it is standard to assume, following Bisin and Gottardi
(1999), that nonexclusive competition forces prices to be linear. Yet, as Theorem 3 shows,
this is consistent with third-best efficiency only in the special private-value case. A natural
alternative is to consider strategic models in which firms compete through menus of bilateral
contracts. Side trading is then captured by letting consumers free to trade with any subset
of firms, in contrast with the exclusivity assumption made in standard competitive screening
models following Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
Attar, Mariotti, and Salanie´ (2014) provide a general analysis of this nonexclusive-
competition scenario. Their main result is that a positive level of trade for type 2 can
be supported in a pure-strategy equilibrium only if type 1 is left out of the market. Indeed,
equilibrium requires that type 1 not be willing to consume at price c, and type 2 purchasing
her optimal quantity at price c2. Given (8)–(11), the resulting equilibrium allocation is a
degenerate third-best one in which (q∗1, t
∗
1) = (0, 0). A necessary and sufficient condition for
decentralization is τ1(0, 0) ≤ c, that is, Akerlof’s (1970) condition for a market breakdown in
which only the worse-quality goods are traded. In all other cases, a pure-strategy equilibrium
fails to exist altogether.
An alternative strategy that has been pursued in the literature consists in designing
extensive-form games that incorporate inter-firm communication. This approach, initiated
by Jaynes (1978) and Hellwig (1988), and further developed by Stiglitz, Yun, and Kosenko
(2018), allows each firm to dynamically react to the information about its customers’ trades
disclosed by its competitors. This may induce a firm to withdraw its initial offers or to
enforce exclusivity clauses, which suggests that these models are better interpreted as models
of endogenous exclusivity than of side trading. In addition, enforcing any such mode of
communication would require a very sophisticated institutional setting to properly take into
account firms’ incentives to reveal information over time.
By contrast, we suggest below some simple market interventions that decentralize the
third-best allocation. The novelty of our proposal consists in the explicit consideration of
public programs that the agents can complement by resorting to the private sector, therefore
endogenously determining the aggregate level of trade. Their simplicity lies in the fact that
little information is required for public authorities. We develop our discussion in the context
13
of insurance and financial markets.
Insurance Markets In modern health-insurance systems, public insurance schemes for
the provision of basic coverage do not prevent an active role for the private sector. In
Germany, consumers can opt out from the public-insurance scheme to buy basic coverage
designed and priced by private insurance companies. Consumers also often have the option
to complement basic coverage with additional privately provided coverage, such as mutuelles
in France. Finally, different forms of mandatory health insurance, whereby consumers are
not allowed to remain uninsured, are in place in several systems, as in France, Germany,
Japan, Netherlands, and Switzerland.2
Our analysis suggests a simple intervention that achieves a mix of public and private
insurance, with no need for observability requirements. It consists in letting the State offer
any amount of basic coverage up to q∗1 at the average premium rate c. As private insurance
companies are willing to provide any amount of complementary coverage at the high premium
rate c2, the State together with any insurance company make the third-best tariff available.
Because this tariff is entry-proof, no insurance company has an incentive to deviate and
entry is impossible. Implementing the third-best allocation is therefore compatible with
letting consumers free to choose their preferred level of coverage. This is reminiscent of
the universal health-care vouchers advocated by Emanuel and Fuchs (2005, 2007), whereby
universal coverage is provided while letting consumers free to purchase additional services
or amenities on private insurance markets.
Financial Markets In the aftermath of the recent crisis, the opportunity for agents to
opt out of a public program and trade in private markets has been acknowledged as a key
constraint for the design of financial institutions in the presence of adverse selection. In
this respect, recent works have suggested a rationale for liquidity-injection programs that
provide a credible signal to uninformed lenders by rejuvenating the relevant markets. An
optimal intervention then typically consists in attracting only the least profitable borrowers,
either through direct lending (Philippon and Skreta (2012)), or by repurchasing low-quality
assets (Tirole (2012)). By participating in a bailout program, a borrower may however end
up signalling her financial weakness to the market, creating a stigma effect with potentially
perverse implications (Gorton (2015)).
While bailout policies are derived under the assumption that public and private liquidity
are mutually exclusive, our approach offers a general theoretical framework for evaluating
public interventions in situations where privately informed borrowers may complement a
2We refer to the surveys of Thomson and Mossialos (2009) and Thomson, Osborne, Squires, and Jun
(2013) for institutional details and cross-country evidence.
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public program with additional funds raised on private markets. A possible intervention
would require public liquidity provision to involve a price sufficiently low, c, so as to attract
all borrowers, and a borrowing limit q∗1 such that no overborrowing by the least profitable
ones is possible. Further borrowing may then take place on private markets at price c2.
Overall, such an intervention would implement the third-best allocation, thereby achieving
budget balance, unlike those proposed by Philippon and Skreta (2012) and Tirole (2012),
and inducing all types of borrowers to participate. This in turn would make it harder to
infer their individual financial conditions, mitigating the impact of the stigma effect. Finally,
the corresponding allocation of funds is the only one that can be reached under a budget-
balanced program under the threat of side trading.
5 Concluding Remarks
We would like to conclude by mentioning two avenues for future research.
First, we have followed Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and many authors since in assuming
that there are only two types of consumers. This, in particular, enabled us to directly
compare our results to the characterization of the second-best efficiency frontier in Crocker
and Snow (1985). Yet the question naturally arises to which extent our results are robust
to this assumption. Attar, Mariotti, and Salanie´ (2019a) show that, in general, there exists
a unique convex tariff for the planner that is entry-proof and implements a budget-feasible
allocation. However, it is not straightforward to extend this uniqueness result to more than
two types when the planner’s tariff is nonconvex.3 Preliminary work suggests that imposing
more structure on the consumers’ preferences, as arises for instance in a Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976) economy, might be instrumental for such an extension.
Second, we have throughout the analysis postulated that, given the planner’s tariff, an
entrant can make a take-it-or-leave-it tariff offer to consumers. In that sense, bilateral trading
is frictionless in our model. An alternative to this assumption, and to the standard Walrasian
approach to side trading, would be to assume that bilateral trades are the outcome of a
dynamic matching and bargaining game between firms and consumers searching for trade
partners, in the spirit of Gale (2000). The planner may then be able to manipulate the
outcome of this game by making search more costly, possibly enabling him to enlarge the
set of implementable allocations and to achieve redistribution. More generally, the optimal
manipulation of the market for side trades, which we have by assumption ruled out from our
analysis, is an important topic for future investigations.
3Technically, this is because such a tariff may cause the consumers’ indirect utility functions, as defined
in the proof of Lemma 3, to fail to satisfy a single-crossing condition. Notice in any case that the existence
of a budget-balanced allocation robust to side trading is always guaranteed.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3. Each type i evaluates any contract (qE, tE) she can trade with the
entrant through the indirect utility function
z−Pi (q
E, tE) ≡ max{ui(qP + qE, T P (qP ) + tE) : qP ≥ 0}. (A.1)
Because ui is strictly quasiconcave and T
P is convex, the maximum in (A.1) is attained at
a unique q̂Pi (q
E), and (q̂Pi (q
E), qEi ) is a solution to (3) if and only if
qEi ∈ arg max{z−Pi (qE, TE(qE)) : qE ≥ 0}. (A.2)
According to Attar, Mariotti, and Salanie´ (2019b, Lemma 1), the convexity of the tariff T P
and the strict single-crossing condition for the functions ui imply the following single-crossing
condition for the functions z−Pi :
For all qE < qE, tE, and tE, z−P1 (q
E, tE) < z−P1 (q
E, tE) implies z−P2 (q
E, tE) < z−P2 (q
E, tE).
To conclude, suppose that qE2 < q
E
1 at some solution ((q
P
i , q
E
i ))i=1,2 to (3). By (A.2),
z−P2 (q
E
2 , T
E(qE2 )) ≥ z−P2 (qE1 , TE(qE1 )).
Because qE2 < q
E
1 , the above single-crossing condition then implies
z−P1 (q
E
2 , T
E(qE2 )) ≥ z−P1 (qE1 , TE(qE1 )).
Thus (q̂P1 (q
E
2 ), q
E
2 ) is also a solution to (3) for type 1. The result follows. 
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